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SURVEY: WOMEN AND 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
This survey of California law, a regular feature of 
the Women's Law Forum, summarizes recent Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court and Court of Appeal deci-
sions of special importance to women. A brief 
analysis of the issues pertinent to women raised 
in ea~h case is provided. 
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I. FAMILY LAW 
A. ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS 
1. Presumption of community property is not affected by a 
time-limited antenuptial agreement. 
In re Marriage of Grinius, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1179, 212 Cal. 
Rptr. 803 (4th Dist. 1985). The California Court of Appeal in In 
re Marriage of Grinius reversed the trial court's judgment that 
restaurant real property was separate property, and directed the 
court to determine whether the husband should be reimbursed 
for separate property contributions. 
On the date of their marriage, the parties, Joyce and Victor, 
entered into an antenuptial agreement providing that separate 
property obtained before marriage be maintained as such for six 
years. After that, the parties' rights and obligations would be as 
provided by law. While married, the couple purchased a restau-
rant with two purchase money loans. One loan, secured by sepa-
rate and community property, was used for the down payment, 
remodeling the premises, purchasing equipment and paying both 
living and business expenses. The other loan was secured by a 
first deed of trust on the restaurant property. Without Joyce's 
knowledge, Victor placed title to the restaurant property in his 
name only. 
Upon dissolution of the marriage, Victor relied on the ante-
nuptial agreementl to support a separate property claim on the 
restaurant and to overcome the presumption of community 
property.2 He asserted that because he took title in his name 
only, believing the antenuptial agreement entitled him to do so, 
he was the sole owner of the restaurant. 
The Grinius court disagreed with him, reasoning that the 
agreement was an' attempt to maintain the separate character of 
1. See Barker v. Barker, 139 Cal. App. 2d 206, 212 (1956). "Parties contemplating 
marriage may validly contract as to their property rights, both as to property then owned 
by them and as to property, including earnings, which may be acquired by them after 
marriage." I d. 
2. CAL, Cry. CODE § 5110 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986). "[A]ll real property situated in 
this state and all personal property wherever situated acquired during the marriage by a 
married person while domiciled in this state ... is community property .... " Id. 
4
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certain assets acquired prior to and during the marriage, but was 
time-limited. The court concluded that such agreements can 
control,3 but even if this contract granted Victor such authority, 
it expired before the dissolution action. Thus the community 
presumption was retroactively reinstated. 
By the terms of the contract, six years after the marriage 
date, and retroactive to it, the spouses were reinvested with 
every communal right. The court therefore held that the pre-
sumption of· community property was not affected by the ante-
nuptial agreement. 
Victor also asserted that his separate property funds were 
used to make substantial payments on both loans and to retire 
one of them. Citing In re Marriage of Mix,4- he claimed thai the 
purchase money loan payments derived from separate property 
and since the restaurant property was so acquired, the same sep-
arate character was maintained. The court of appeal pointed out 
that in See v. See/' the determination of whether property is 
separate or community was made at the time of acquisition. 
Since the property here was acquired after the marriage, it was 
presumed to be community property.6 
In looking at the character of the credit acquisitions during 
marriage, the court relied on the "intent of the lender" rule de-
veloped in In re Marriage of Aufmuth.7 In Aufmuth, the court 
of appeal decided that the character of such acquisitions was de-
termined by whether the lender relied on the collateral as sepa-
rate property or as a community asset. 
In applying the "intent of the lender" rule, the court said 
that California courts have consistently employed this rule, but 
with inconsistent results. The arinius court decided that the 
3. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 
(1976) (parties are bound by the terms of the antenuptial agreement as long as marriage 
dissolution is not thereby being promoted or encouraged). The validity of such agree-
ments turns on the language within the contract itself. 
4. 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975) (separate property can be 
established by tracing directly to the source of funds used for acquisition of the property 
in question). 
5. 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966). 
6. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986). 
7. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979). 
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standard shall be that the acquisition of loan proceeds during 
marriage are presumptively community property. This presump-
tion may be overcome by showing the lender intended to rely 
solely upon' separate property in offering the loan. Since one of 
the loans was based upon the community's ability to manage the 
restaurant and repay the note, and the other was extended in 
reliance on the already acquired interest in the restaurant, the 
court did not find evidence of such intent. Thus, it found that 
the loan funds were a community asset and not separate 
property. 
Although Joyce maintained that reimbursement should be 
granted solely for Victor's separate property contributions to the 
restaurant property, the court rejected that premise. Civil Code 
section 4800.28 controlled the separate property issue and re-
quired the court to find how much of the total community acqui-
sitions could be traced to Victor's contributions from his sepa-
rate property. The parties had not presented evidence on the 
reimbursement issue and since Victor's separate property contri-
bution was so commingled with the community acquisitions, the 
court of appeal reversed the trial court as to the entire property 
division. 
In an effort to reach a just resolution, the Grinius court 
looked critically at the antenuptial agreement and by upholding 
its terms, essentially deactivated its effect on acquisitions during 
the first six years of marriage. In so doing, the court made it all 
the more important for the parties of such an agreement to be 
careful in its wording. They will be held to its terms. 
In addition, by reaffirming the "intent of the lender" rule 
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1986). 
In the division of community property under this part unless a 
party has made a written waiver of the right to reimbursement 
or signed a writing that has the effect of a waiver, the party 
shall be reimbursed for his or her contributions to the acquisi-
tion of the property to the extent the party traces the contri-
butions to a separate property source. 
[d. This statute applies to actions not yet final on January 1, 1984. It refers to reim-
bursement of separate property contributions traceable to community property acquisi-
tions including: down payments, payments for property improvements and payments re-
ducing the principal of a loan used to finance any property purchase or improvement. It 
does not include loan interest payments or any maintenance, insurance or property tax 
payments. [d. 
6
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and in utilizing the simple test of lender sole reliance, the court 
applied a more equitable method of determining the character of 
loan acquisitions. This is consistent with the underlying policy 
of California's community property plan-to equally divide all 
community assets in a marital dissolution. 
Linda C. Kr-amer 
2. An antenuptial agreement that promotes divorce is void as 
against public policy. 
In re Marriage of Noghrey, 169 Cal. App. 3d 326, 215 Cal. 
Rptr. 153 (6th Dist. 1985). In In re Marriage of Noghrey, the 
California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and found an 
antenuptial agreement to be invalid because it encouraged 
divorce. 
The terms of the antenuptial agreement were written by a 
guest9 on the reverse side of a Kethuba10 immediately preceding 
the wedding of Farima and Kambiz Noghrey. The terms were: 
"I, Kambiz Noghrey, agree to settle on Farima Human the house 
... and $500,000 or one-half my assets, whichever is greater, in 
the event of a divorce .... " 
Farima testified at the trial that she signed the document 
because she wanted protection in the event of divorce. In consid-
eration for the agreement she assured Kambiz of her virginity 
and was medically examined for that purpose. Kambiz testified 
he was coerced into signing the agreement by Farima's mother 
who told him there would be no wedding unless he did so. Seven 
months after the wedding Farima filed for divorce. 
Kambiz appealed the trial court's decision upholding the 
antenuptial agreement. The court of appeal was in accord with 
9. The guest happened to be an attorney whom the parties prevailed upon to write 
the document just as she arrived at the wedding. 
10. R B. WISCHNITZER, 6 THE UNIVERSAL JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA (1942). The Kethuba 
is a marriage document which under Judaism details the rights and responsibilities of 
the husband to the wife upon divorce. Under Judaic law the husband can divorce the 
wife at will and therefore the Kethuba was meant to provide economic security for her. 
On the other hand, by making divorce costly for the husband, the Kethuba discouraged 
divorce. Should the wife choose to divorce the husband she was subject to either a reduc-
tion or complete loss of her rights. 
7
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Kambiz that this particular agreement promoted and en-
couraged divorce and was thereby unenforceable as contrary to 
California public policy. 
The court of appeal pointed out that antenuptial agree-
ments which merely attempt to characterize property acquired 
after marriage or which seek to maintain the separate property 
characteristics of property acquired before marriage, are gener-
ally binding.ll However, the Noghrey agreement encouraged 
Farima to seek a divorce because divorce was the only way she 
would have rights to the money and property. According to its 
terms, had Kambiz died, the contract would have been nullified 
and Farima would have received nothing. 
In In re Marriage of Higgason12 the California Supreme 
Court found that agreements which provide for a settlement 
only in the event of a divorce are against public policy and con-
sequently void. By citing a lengthy list of cases, the Noghrey 
court illustrated that this rule of law has prevailed since Califor-
nia's early history.13 
Linda C. Kramer 
B. CHILD CUSTODY 
1. The custody rights of an unmarried father who is an un-
emancipated minor are subordinate to the state's interest 
in avoiding an environment which is detrimental to the 
child. 
Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 705 P.2d 362, 218 
Cal. Rptr. 39 (1985). In Michael U. v. Jamie B., the California 
11. See In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 
(1976) (parties are bound by the terms of the antenuptial agreement as long as marital 
dissolution is not thereby promoted or encouraged). 
12. 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973). 
13. See, e.g., Morgan v. Morgan, 190 Cal. 522, 213 P. 993 (1923) (the policy of the 
law is not to encourage divorce); Whiting v. Whiting, 62 Cal. App. 157, 216 P. 92 (1923) 
(courts should not sanction contracts that tend to encourage marital dissolution); New-
man v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 P. 907 (1900) (an agreement between a husband and wife 
which is founded upon doing something to facilitate a divorce or to abandon a defense to 
a divorce is void and illegal); Loveren v. Loveren, 106 Cal. 509, 39 P. 801 (1895) (if the 
objective of a contract is the dissolution of a marriage contract, or to encourage that 
result, it is a contract contra bono mores). 
8
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Supreme Court reversed the Orange County Superior Court de-
cision that awarded temporary custody to the father, an unmar-
ried, unemancipated minor. Four separate opinions were issued 
from a philosophically fractured court. Justice Broussard stated 
in the lead opinion that the trial court abused its discretion by 
holding that custody by the father would not be detrimental to 
the interests of the infant. 
The father (Michael) was sixteen years old at the time of 
conception, and the mother (Jamie) was twelve. When Jamie in-
formed Michael that she was pregnant, he immediately acknowl-
edged responsibility and expressed a desire to secure custody. 
Jamie, however, determined that a married couple would be 
more capable of providing a satisfactory environment for the in-
fant. She subsequently secured an adoptive couple. Michael 
withheld consent to the adoption and filed a petition to establish 
paternity under the Uniform Parentage Act (Act}.14 The court 
awarded Michael temporary custody, but Jamie's appeal re-
strained Michael from securing physical custody of the infant so 
as to establish his status as a legal parent with custodial rights. II> 
Justice Broussard acknowledged the court had, in In re 
Baby Girl M.,16 established the appropriate standard for resolv-
ing custody disputes between natural fathers and prospective 
adoptive parents.The court held in Baby Girl M. that Civil Code 
section 4600 mandated that no adoption could transpire without 
both parents' consent, unless a court found that awarding cus-
tody to one of the parents would be detrimental to the interests 
of the infant. I? The court further noted that the standard of 
"best interests of the child" is applicable to custody questions 
between parents, but that case law imposes an additional re-
quirement if the custody dispute is between parent and 
nonparent.18 In In re B.G., the California Supreme Court held 
14. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986)_ 
15. The Uniform Parentage Act set forth the rights of parents in the event one par-
ent proposed adoption of the child. Id. § 7017. The Act established a hierarchy of father-
hood in which a "natural" father may be afforded fewer parental rights than a "pre-
sumed" father. Id. § 7004. The Act also provided several methods for a "natural" father 
to establish "presumed" status. Id. One such method was for Michael to receive the child 
into his home and to openly assert the child as his natural child. Id. § 7004(d)(4). 
16. 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984). 
17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986). 
18. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974). 
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that an award to a nonparent required a finding that custody by 
the parent would be "detrimental to the child."l9 
Justice Kaus, in his concurring opinion, expressed dismay at 
the Baby Girl M. decision. Although he stated that the decision 
in the instant case was "the only result which comports with jus-
tice," the decision seemed to be derived from specious logic that 
"comes close to impinging upon the substantial evidence rule."20 
Justice Mosk concurred with the Michael U. majority and 
joined in Justice Kaus's concern over the Baby Girl M. decision. 
But he also expressed concern with the limitations of the legal 
arguments Justice Broussard's employed in Michael U. Justice 
Mosk opined that the court's prior decision established a rule 
which permitted the "casual inseminator" to thwart an unmar-
ried mother's adoption attempt by merely withholding his con-
sent. Justice Mosk suggested that any legal test that would 
award custody to a sixteen-year-old youth, who is the biological 
father and arguably a rapist, clearly established the fallacy of 
any theory but the traditional one: "when there is an unmarried 
mother who proposes to place her child for adoption, and a bio-
logical but not presumed father [contests], the trial court should 
only consider the best interests of the child." 
Justice Broussard was apparently unwilling to overrule 
Baby Girl M., and maintained its "detrimental" criterion rather 
than the traditional "best interests" rule. Justice Broussard as-
serted that the trial judge failed to utilize the existing case law 
that provided the procedural analysis to be used in situations 
like Michael U.21 
Consequently, Justice Broussard stated that the only issue 
before the court was whether the implied finding at the hearing 
that custody by Michael would not be detrimental was sup-
ported by substantial evidence. The record, to Justice Brous-
sard's satisfaction, established "uncontroverted" evidence that 
19. ld. at 698, 523 P.2d at 257, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 457. 
20. 9 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, APPEAL § 278, at 289 (3d ed. 1985). 
21. In re Rose Lynn G., 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1976). First, the 
facts established at the custody hearing must support the decision and second, one party 
had to request the court to scrutini2e the ability of the custody·seeking parent to provide 
a satisfactory environment for the child. ld. 
10
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Michael lacked the maturity to care for a child; he had difficulty 
in school, rebelled against authority, smoked marijuana and had 
a history of sexual relations with females under the age of con-
sent. The Justice also noted that the infant had been living with 
the adoptive parents for some time and had established an im-
portant bond with them.22 The court decided that a break in 
that bond would be detrimental to the infant. Consequently, the 
majority held that the lower court's decision was not supported 
by substantial evidence. 
Justice Reynoso dissented. He accused the majority of sub-
stituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. Justice 
Reynoso stated that appellate review of a trial court ruling for 
an alleged lack of substantial evidence "does not permit weigh-
ing of evidence or reversal of a judgment in accordance with the 
preponderance thereof."23 He further stated that barring preju-
dicial error, a lower court judgment that appears to be against 
the weight of the evidence should be affirmed by a reviewing tri-
bunal unless substantial evidence supporting the trial judgment 
does not exist.24 The trier of fact, he concluded, was in the best 
position to establish credibility of the witnesses.25 
Justice Reynoso also faulted the majority's application of 
the process established in Baby Girl M. The majority in Michael 
U. held that the best interests of the child should be balanced 
equally with any detriment to the child that might result if the 
court awards to one of the parents. The proper application of 
the Baby Girl M. rule, according to Justice Reynoso, would have 
awarded custody to Michael. Under Justice Reynoso's sequential 
analysis, a court would determine whether custody by the fa-
ther-in and of itself-would be detrimental to the child. If cus-
tody by the father would not be detrimental, a court need not 
proceed further.26 He concluded that the reasoning followed by 
the majority, combined with the lengthy judicial process, effec-
tively penalized Michael U. 
22. At trial, a child psychiatrist testified that Eric (the infant) had established an 
emotional attachment to the adoptive parents and would suffer learning and develop-
ment difficulties if the relationship was severed. 
23. 9 WITKIN, supra note 20, § 278, at 289. 
24. Id. § 281, at 292. 
25. Id. § 279, at 291. 
26. In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984). 
11
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In Michael U., the California Supreme Court faced a state-
ment of public policy from the legislature which set out the pri-
orities and methods of awarding custody where an unmarried fa-
ther contests custody by adoptive parents. The same court that 
established the guidelines to support that public policy in Baby 
Girl M. is understandably reticient to overrule itself. Equally 
important, the court wished to avoid projecting inconsistency. 
Unfortunately, the court was obliged to deal with a public 
policy that appeared acceptable at inception but, in light of 
Baby Girl M. and Michael U., hasn't worked. The standard set 
forth in Baby Girl M. and Civil Code section 4600 requiring the 
contesting party to show "detrimental" impact on the child to 
avoid custody by a parent embraces too low a threshold for the 
court to enforce. On the other hand, the traditional doctrine 
that called for a decision in the best interest of the child, may be 
too restrictive for the court to reinstate. 
The dilemma of how to reconcile two contradictory stan-
dards without appearing to vacillate on the emotional issue of 
child custody caused the court in Michael U. to decide the case 
on procedural grounds. The construct avoided the unsatisfactory 
result that would ensue from following Baby Girl M. (Michael 
gets custody), and it also avoided the appearance of inconsis-
tency which would be caused by overruling a recent precedent. 
The court's refusal to overrule Baby Girl M. eliminated the op-
portunity to decisively reestablish the bright line rule of "in the 
best interests of the child." Instead, the court found that the 
trial court made a procedural error. Justice Broussard claimed 
the trial decision necessarily implied that Michael's custody 
would not be detrimental to the infant. He found that conclu-
sion hard to accept in view of Michael's age and relative imma-
turity. Yet, as Justice Reynoso pointed out, Michael had taken 
several major steps to correct his character deficiencies since the· 
custody question arose.27 
The supreme court's decision in Michael U. essentially sub-
sumes all rights of unmarried fathers to the majority of the 
court's implicit belief that any radical change is detrimental to 
27. Michael was interested in establishing a home for the infant with relatives and 
friends as a support group. He decided to return to school; he took classes at a commu-
nity college on child-rearing and he made an e~ort to find employment. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss3/6
1986] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 567 
the child. The formula the court employed will effectively termi-
nate an unmarried father's rights as soon as the infant emotion-
ally bonds with anyone the mother has selected for custody. The 
disharmonious rules promulgated in Baby Girl M. and Michael 
U. leave no clear path by which trial judges can uniformly de-
cide cases like these. The resulting confusion at the trial level 
practically mandates an appeal no matter how and what the 
trial judge decides. 
T.A. Graudin 
2. To terminate parental rights, there must be clear and con-
vincing evidence that severance is the least detrimental al-
ternative to protect the child's welfare. 
In re R.B., 167 Cal. App. 3d 946, 213 Cal. Rptr. 690 (5th 
Dist. 1985). In re R.B. concerned a custody dispute between a 
mildly retarded mother and a couple who wished to adopt the 
child. The California Court of Appeal held that before terminat-
ing the parental rights of a mildly mentally retarded mother, the 
court must explore other less drastic alternatives. 
Tanya S., the mildly mentally retarded mother, had a five-
year-old son, R.S. The trial court applied California Civil Code 
section 23228 and declared R.S. free from her custody and con-
trol. The court appointed Donald and Debra H., the petitioners, 
as guardians. 
During the first two years of R.S. 's life, Tanya was involved 
with Central Valley Regional Center (CVRC) which offered a va-
riety of supportive programs. CVRC tested R.S. and concluded 
he was normal, not developmentally disabled, and was receiving 
good care and attention. When R.S. was three-years old, he and 
Tanya lived with Jean Gildez, a woman who exploited and 
manipUlated Tanya. R.S. started preschool but after four 
months the school insisted that R.S. be withdrawn primarily be-
cause he wasn't toilet trained. The teachers also described R.S. 
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(6)(West 1982 & Supp. 1986) which provides in pertinent 
part: "An action may be brought for the purpose of having any person under the age of 
18 years declared free from the custody and control of either or both of his parents when 
[they] are ••. incapable of supporting or controlling the child ... because of .•• 
mental illness .... n ld. 
13
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as developmentally behind students his age and immature. 
Gildez convinced Tanya to give R.S. to petitioners. Tanya 
signed the guardianship papers, however they were incorrectly 
completed and never filed. Nonetheless the petitioners took R.S. 
with them to their home in Oregon. 
Tanya immediately regretted her decision to release R.S. to 
the petitioners. She moved out of the home she shared with 
Gildez and CVRC placed her in a program to help her develop 
independent living skills. Tanya did well in the program because 
she believed her success would enable her to properly care for 
R.S. and get him back. Gildez once again interfered and caused 
Tanya to drop out of the program. 
Donald and Debra H. filed one petition to obtain guardian-
ship of R.S. and a second petition to terminate Tanya's parental 
rights. The trial court appointed the district attorney to re-
present R.S. and after a hearing, temporarily placed R.S. in peti-
tioners' custody. Two-and-a-half months later the trial court 
granted both petitions. 
In In re Carmeleta B.,29 the California Supreme Court 
stated that mentally ill persons are those who are in need of su-
pervision, treatment, care, restraint, or who are dangerous to 
themselves, to others or to the property of others. The supreme 
court would not extend this definition of mental illness to facili-
tate the termination of parental rights, saying the strictness of 
the definition acted as a safeguard to protect the primacy of the 
family. . 
In In re Angelia P.,30 the supreme court held that while the 
right to parent is a fundamental right it is not absolute and may 
have to yield to the rights of the child. The supreme court held 
that a finding to terminate parental rights under Civil Code sec-
tion 232 must be supported by "clear and convincing evi-
dence. "31 The court further held that in an action to terminate 
parental rights the trial court must find that course of action to 
be the least detrimental alternative for the minor. 
29. 21 Cal. 3d 482, 579 P.2d 514, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978). 
30. 28 Cal. 3d 908, 623 P.2d 198, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1981). 
31. Id. at 919, 623 P.2d at 204, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 643 (emphallis in original). 
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In In re David B.,32 the court held that Civil Code section 
232 was valid and did not deny a parent substantive due process 
if two conditions were met: 1) the mental illness is settled and 
will continue for an indefinite period of time regardless of medi-
cal treatment and 2) that severance of the parental relationship 
is the least detrimental alternative available to protect the wel-
fare of the child. 
In the instant case, the trial court did not find by clear and 
convincing evidence that severing the parental relationship was 
the least detrimental alternative available to protect R.S. Nor 
did the court establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
Tanya's mental illness was such that she would not be able to 
properly care for R.S. in the future. Therefore the court of ap-
peal reversed the order to sever the parental relationship and 
remanded the case for the trial court to examine further 
evidence. 
The custody order, which was severable from the order ter-
minating Tanya's parental rights, was upheld because the evi-
dence was overwhelming that at the time of the hearing Tanya 
was unable to take care of R.S. by herself.33 
The court of appeal has protected the rights of both parent 
and child by applying a strict standard to sever parental rights, 
while at the same time allowing temporary custody by 
nonparents. While the best interests of the child should be the 
paramount consideration in custody battles, the rights of par-
ents and the preservation of the family should also be 
important. 
Donna Cobe Beekman 
32. 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979). 
33. Tanya also claimed she was denied effective assistance of counsel. Although 
Tanya's counsel made several omissions, Tanya did not show that but for these omission 
the result of her case would have been different. Therefore counsel's failure to object to 
inadmissible hearsay or his failure to assert the attorney-client privilege or his failure to 
object to the appointment of the district attorney to represent R.S. did not amount to 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Tanya also claimed her attorney should have requested 
a determination of her competency. The court of appeal pointed out that showing Tanya 
was incompetent would have directly hurt her cause by proving she was not capable of 
rearing R.S. 
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3. In an action to terminate parental rights, the court's para-
mount consideration is providing a loving, stable home for 
the minor. 
In re Jacqueline G., 165 Cal. App. 3d 582, 211 Cal. Rptr. 
827 (1st Dist. 1985). In In re Jacqueline G., the court of appeal 
held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial 
court's termination of the natural father's parental rights, and 
that this course was in the child's best interest. 
The natural father, Manuel G., and the minor, Jacqueline 
G. (Jackie) appealed from a judgment declaring Jackie free from 
Manuel's custody and referring her to the Department of Social 
Services for adoption. Manuel had an extensive criminal record 
and history of drug involvement. He was unemployed and re-
ceived supplemental sec~ity income for emotional disability.34 
Manuel had not had a home of his own since Jackie's birth. Ma-
nuel's probation reports indicated he had always loved Jackie 
and wanted to be with her, but that he displayed a very limited 
understanding of Jackie's needs and little, if any, ability to par-
ent effectively. Jackie's natural mother, Sally S., had relin-
quished the minor for adoption. 
A clinical psychologist testified that Jackie felt she was part 
of the adoptive S. family, derived no pleasure from visits with 
her natural father, and would like to terminate the visits. The 
psychologist further indicated that Jackie would feel more se-
cure and stable if she were permanently adopted by the S. 
family. 
Jackie did not argue that she should be placed in Manuel's 
custody but asserted that the termination of her father's paren-
tal rights would free her for adoption, thereby threatening po-
tential inheritance rights in trusts through her natural mother. 
The trusts had an actuarial value of approximately $75,000, but 
Jackie's rights in them were extremely remote.35 
34. Manuel's I.Q. was between 90 and 100. He was diagnosed as a paranoid schizo-
phrenic, acute and chronic, severe with symptomatic agitation and depression. 
35. Jackie would take only if her mother and grandmother failed to exercise certain 
"powers of appointment" over the principal of the trusts. Jackie could only take the 
principal of the largest trust if her mother, then age 31, predeceases her grandmother, 
then age 67. 
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Manuel, whose primary goal was to maintain visitation 
rights with Jackie, contended that the trial court erred in failing 
to consider a plan for reunification. At the time of the hearing 
there was no statutory mandate for the court to consider re-
uniting Jackie and Manuel, but the trial court did take into ac-
count Manuel's minimal efforts to establish a home. The court 
found it must balance all factors which affect the minor's wel-
fare; finances were but one aspect to consider in determining the 
child's best interests. The minor's immediate need for a child-
hood untroubled by insecurity and anxiety outweighed the re-
mote possibility of an inheritance. The court found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Jackie came within the description of 
the Civil Code section 23236 and that termination of parental 
rights was in her best interest. 
The main thrust of Jackie's appeal was that the court inade-
quately considered the less detrimental alternative of guardian-
ship. A guardianship would allow Jackie to continue living with 
the S. family without terminating Manuel's parental rights and 
thereby perfectly preserving any potential inheritance. Manuel 
joined the appeal because guardianship would enable him to 
continue visitation with Jackie. 
The lower court found that Jackie had been in the foster 
home for more than two years. Manuel had failed and was likely 
to fail in the future to provide a home for Jackie, to provide care 
and control for her and to maintain an adequate parental rela-
36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). At the time of the hearing 
in 1981, Civil Code section 232 provided, in relevant part: 
ld. 
(a) An action may be brought for the purpose of having any 
person under the age of 18 years declared free from the cus-
tody and control of either or both of his parents when such 
person comes within any of the following descriptions: (7) 
Who has been cared for in one or more foster homes, • . • 
under the supervision of the juvenile court, . . . for two or 
more consecutive years, providing that the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that return of the child to his parent 
or parents would be detrimental to the child and that the par-
ent or parents . . . have failed during such period, and are 
likely to fail in the future, to do the following: 
(i) Provide a home for the child; 
(ii) Provide care and control for the child; and 
(iii) Maintain an adequate parental relationship with the 
child. 
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tionship with her. The court concluded that awarding custody to 
Manuel would be detrimental to Jackie. The trial court further 
found that termination of visitation rights and awarding custody 
to the S. family was the best alternative. 
The court of appeal noted that an order referring a minor 
for adoption is only an interim order, a preliminary step in pro-
ceedings that mayor may not culminate in a final order for 
adoption. A court hearing on the petition for adoption must fol-
low this interlocutory order. Thus there would be additional 
time before a petition of adoption was granted to explore the 
parameters of Jackie's inheritance rights through Sally S. 
Although the best interest of the minor should be the para-
mount consideration, this weighty concern should not trample 
the rights of parents. Manuel was seeking to preserve visitation 
rights and was not seeking custody of Jackie. Therefore the 
court's focus on Manuel's parenting abilities were off point. Be-
cause the alternative of guardianship would have allowed Jackie 
to live with the S. family as well as allow Manuel to visit with 
his daughter, the court should have explored it with more care. 
Donna Cobe Beekman 
4. In custody disputes between a noncustodial parent and a 
nonparent, the nonparent shall prevail if it is in the best 
interests of the child. 
In re Angelica M., 170 Cal. App. 3d 210, 216 Cal. Rptr. 18 
(4th Dist. 1985). In In re Angelica M., the court of appeal held 
that the trial court erred by applying the wrong standard in a 
custody dispute. 
Angelica M., a six-year-old child, appealed from a disposi-
tional order which placed her in the custody of her father.s7 An-
gelica was in the legal and physical custody of her mother when 
she was sexually abused by her mother's boyfriend. The mother 
37. Placement with the father had several conditions. He had to 1) obtain counsel-
ing for Angelica, 2) not use alcohol to excess, 3) not use drugs in Angelica's presence, 4) 
not allow Angelica in his car if he had been drinking or using drugs, and 5) Angelica was 
not to be in the presence of two named individuals. According to a social worker's report 
one of the persons was the father's brother-in-law who had molested Angelica. 
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subsequently married the boyfriend. Angelica's father had a his-
tory of alcohol and marijuana abuse, lacked job stability, had a 
minimal income and lived with his parents in an overcrowded 
home. The appeal record also indicated that the father had no 
consistent contact with Angelica. 
Angelica was living temporarily with her maternal grand-
parents, doing well in school and receiving counseling. Her psy-
chologist strongly recommended continued placement with the 
maternal grandparents. 
The trial court relied on Welfare and Institutions Code sec-
tion 361(b) which provided in part: 
No dependent child shall be taken from the phys-
ical custody of his or her parents or guardians 
unless, upon the hearing, the juvenile court finds 
clear and convincing evidence of any of the fol-
lowing: . . . danger to the physical health of the 
minor[,] . . . the parent. . . is unwilling to have 
physical custody[,] ... severe emotional dam-
age[,] ... the minor has been sexually 
abused .... 38 
The court of appeal held the trial court erred because the 
minor was not in the physical custody of her father; section 361 
only applies to taking a child from the physical custody of a par-
ent. The court relied on In re B. G.a9 which held that Civil Code 
section 4600 governs custody disputes between custodial 
nonparents and noncustodial parents.40 Under section 4600, an 
award of custody: 1) must be made in the best interests of the 
child, 2) there must be an express finding that parental custody 
would be detrimental to the minor, and 3) the findings must be 
supported by evidence showing that parental custody would ac-
tually harm the child. 
The trial court had awarded the father custody because it 
was unable to find clear and convincing evidence of one of the 
abuses listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 361. The 
trial court thought it was limited to those abuses but the court 
38. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). 
39. In re B. G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974). 
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986). 
19
Kramer et al.: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
574 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:555 
of appeal held otherwise. While an abuse described in section 
361 would satisfy the evidentiary finding of actual harm re-
quired by In re B.G., a court has discretion to explore abuses not 
in the code. According to the court of appeal, the key considera-
tion should be the best interests of the child. 
Donna Cobe Beekman 
C. COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
1. The doctrine of resulting trust bars one spouse from de-
stroying the other's community property interest in mili-
tary retirement benefits. 
In re Marriage of Mastropaolo, 166 Cal. App. 3d 953, 213 
Cal. Rptr. 26 (4th Dist. 1985). The California Court of Appeal in 
In re Marriage of Mastropaolo affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment awarding the former wife (Henriette) a community prop-
erty interest in the portion of the husband's (Steven) military 
disability retirement pension that would have been paid to him 
as a longevity retirement benefit. The court held that the doc-
trine of resulting trust41 barred the husband from destroying the 
wife's right to her community property share of the longevity 
retirement benefits. 
The parties separated in 1972, after more than nineteen 
years of marriage. Three months later Steven retired from the 
Air Force with a 100 % disability rating. He could have chosen to 
receive longevity retirement benefits instead of disability retire-
ment benefits because he had more than twenty years of service. 
The marriage was dissolved in 1981 and two years later trial en-
41. See Seabury v. Costello, 209 Cal. App. 2d 640, 645, 26 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251 (1962). 
"Neither written evidence nor express declaration of trust is required •.•. A resulting 
trust is implied from facts and circumstances ••. and arises by presumption of law." [d. 
See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (5th ed. 1979). 
[d. 
Trust implied in law • . . in which a party, through no actual 
or constructive fraud, becomes invested with legal title. . . for 
the benefit of another, although without expressed intent to 
do so, because of a presumption of such intent arising by oper-
ation of law . . . . A "resulting trust" arises where a person 
makes or causes to be made a disposition of property under 
circumstances which raise an inference that he does not intend 
that person taking or holding the property should have the 
beneficial interest therein . . . . 
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sured on the property and support issues. The parties stipulated 
that had Steven elected longevity retirement he would have re-
ceived $117,825.56 attributable to the marriage period, at the 
rate of $1,549.71 per month. 
The trial court determined that Steven's prospective longev-
ity retirement benefit was community property and awarded 
Henriette a 43.65% interest.42 The court granted Steven a 
56.35 % separate property interest in the optional longevity re-
tirement benefits. The additional retirement benefits he received 
included those attributable to his disability. 
Steven appealed the property judgment. He claimed his 
military disability retirement was separate property since it was 
compensation for personal pain and suffering. The court of ap-
peal disagreed and cited the California Supreme Court's decision 
in In re Marriage of Stenquist43 and this court's decision in In 
re Marriage of Mueller44 as controlling. Both those decisions 
held that disability retirement benefits are an employee's sepa-
rate property, unless he or she could also have qualified for lon-
gevity retirement benefits. The courts reasoned that allowing a 
spouse to turn what would be community property into separate 
property is inconsistent with the state's community property 
policy of dividing assets equally. 
The Mastropaolo court concluded that in circumstances 
where the military spouse retires before marital dissolution and 
is then eligible for either longevity or disability retirement bene-
fits, the nonmilitary spouse has a community property interest 
in those benefits. 
Citing McCarty v. McCarty45 Steven asserted that military 
retirement benefits were subject to federal control only. But the 
Mastropaolo court noted that Congress enacted the Federal 
Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act (FUSF-
SPA)46 which nullified McCarty. 
42. The 43.65% share excluded time prior to marriage. 
43. 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978). 
44. 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977). 
45. 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (military longevity retirement pensions are subject to federal 
control only and state courts may not divide them according to state laws upon marital 
dissolution). 
46. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1983). In pertinent part: 
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Steven argued that since FUSFSP A specifically excludes re-
tirement disability pay,47 Congress intended to preempt state 
community property law as to the disposition of those benefits. 
However, the United States Supreme Court in Hisquierdo v. 
Hisquierd048 stated that the correct analysis under the 
supremacy clause is whether Congress specifically enacted pre-
emption of the state law.49 The Mastropaolo court found that 
since Congress did not intend to preempt state law and no fed-
eral interests were threatened, the state court was free to apply 
state law. 
The court of appeal's decision is consistent with the intent 
of California's community property law, that is, to preserve a 
spousal interest. At the same time, this decision promotes the 
congressional intent of FUSFSP A, which is to protect the 
spouses of service personnel. 
Linda C. Kramer 
D. HEALTH AND WELFARE 
1. Income tax refunds should not be deducted from grant 
checks of aid to families with dependent children. 
Vaessen v. Woods, 35 Cal. 3d 749, 677 P.2d 1183, 200 Cal. 
Rptr. 893 (1984). In Vaessen v. Woods, the court held on a four 
to three vote that income tax refunds should not be considered 
income when calculating aid to families with dependent children 
(AFDC).ISO The California Department of Social Services 
[d. 
Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat 
disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay 
periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely 
of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in 
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court. 
47. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) (1983). Disposable retired or retainer pay is defined as: 
"the total monthly retired or retainer pay to which a member is entitled . . • less 
amounts which . . . are required by law to be and are deducted from the retired or 
retainer pay of such member, including ... amounts waived in order to receive compen-
sation under title 5 or title 38 ...• " [d. § 1408(a)(4)(B). 
48. 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (benefits payable under the Railroad Retirement Act of 
1974 may not be divided under state community property law). 
49. [d. 
50. AFDC was established by the Social Security Act of 1935. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 
(1983 & Supp. 1985). It is jointly funded by the federal government and the states and is 
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promulgated a regulation which treated income tax refunds as 
"income"-thereby reducing the grant of aid to AFDC families 
by the amount of the refund. Families whose aid was cut 
brought a class action to enjoin the state from enforcing this reg-
ulation. Plaintiffs were recipients who had been employed long 
enough in a given year to accrue some withholdings, but who 
had not attained self-sufficiency above the minimum standard of 
need.51 
Neither Congress nor the California Legislature had defined 
"resource" or "income." However, the terms do serve as conclu-
sive labels. If a tax refund is labeled income, then the amount of 
the refund is deducted from a future AFDC grant. 52 But if a tax 
refund is labeled a resource the recipient may retain the refund 
without a grant reduction. 53 
The court found three policy reasons why tax refunds 
should be considered resources. First, families need a steady 
source of income to meet their basic recurring needs and obtain 
economic security. Second, treating tax refunds as resources will 
provide incentive for employment. Reducing future grants 
brings about an economic hardship which may cause recipients 
to feel penalized for working and thereby discourage future em-
ployment. Third, the cost of the paperwork required to adjust 
monthly grants would most likely outweigh any fiscal savings the 
state could expect since the average refund is usually only about 
$130. 
administered by the states in a scheme of cooperative federalism. While state participa-
tion is elective, federal funding is conditioned on program compliance with the Social 
Security Act and applicable federal regulations. 
51. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11452 (West Supp. 1986) defines the minimum stan-
dard of adequate as $424 per month for a family of two, $526 for a family of three, $625 
for a family of four and $1130 for a family of ten or more. Id. 
52. Two months after a recipient receives his or her income tax refund the depart-
ment deducts it from the next grant check. Because the normal monthly grant is so small 
recipients often use the tax refund to pay for daily necessities. The court noted that it is 
not realistic to assume that recipients can save the refund for needed expenses two 
months down the road. 
53. Current federal law allows a family to retain resources with a combined equity 
value of less than $1000, plus the home it owns and occupies, plus an automobile with 
equity value of less than $1,500, plus essential household and personal goods. A state 
may specify lower limits on resources. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(B) (Supp. 1985); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 233.20(a)(i)(B) (1985). California permits recipients to retain the maximum resources 
permitted by federal law. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11155,11257 (West 1980 & Supp. 
1986). 
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The court relied on the following federal regulation: "In es-
tablishing financial eligibility in the amount of the assistance 
payment, only such net income as is actually available . . . on a 
regular basis will be considered."54 The court held that since in-
come tax refunds are usually only given once a year if at all, they 
are not received on a regular basis and therefore must be a re-
source. However, prior to this case, Congress deleted the phrase 
"on a regular basis" from the regulations. 55 While the words "on 
a regular basis" no longer appeared in the regulations the court 
held that treating tax refunds as resources furthered the federal 
policy of insuring that needy children will receive a minimally 
adequate level of care and support. 
The court compared AFDC grants to the federal food stamp 
program which specified that income tax refunds be treated as 
resources for the policy reasons discussed previously. The major-
ity found that treating tax refunds as resources rather than in-
come would not, as the state asserted, result in unwarranted 
windfalls allowing persons with substantial financial resources to 
remain on welfare. If a family has too many resources, it be-
comes ineligible for public assistance. 56 
While the majority found that its decision would carry out 
federal policy, the dissent criticized the court for overstepping 
its founds. The dissent argued that the court's sole function was 
to find whether the state regulation conflicted with applicable 
federal statutes, not whether a different policy (treating tax re-
funds as resources) was consistent with the federal regulations. 
The dissent also argued that an agency needs flexibility 
when it implements a statutory scheme. If the agency's first at-
tempt at effectuating a statute doesn't work, it should be able to 
try another method. The dissent found that the effect of the ma-
jority's holding is to restrict an agency to its initial approach 
unless the legislature expressly approves an alternative method. 
54. Former 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (a)(1)(1979) (emphasis added). 
55. In his dissent, Justice Richardson accused the majority of not considering the 
intent of Congress when it deleted "on a regular basis" from the statute. Several court 
decisions had relied on those words in holding that tax refunds were not to be counted as 
income. Justice Richardson found that despite Congressional action to the contrary, the 
majority continued to intuit a federal intention to require regularity. 
56. See supra note 53 for relevant discussion. 
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The majority was correct in its decision to treat tax refunds 
as a resource. The regulation offered only minimal savings to the 
state and clearly would cause hardship to AFDC families who 
struggle to survive on limited grants. A court has the power to 
examine a regulation to see if it is rationally related to the ends 
it is supposed to achieve. However, because the amount of 
money available for public welfare is not limitless, courts should 
tred carefully when their decisions reallocate these funds. While 
the fiscal loss to the state as a result of this decision, if any, is 
minimal, the distribution of welfare is the responsibility of 
elected representatives and not courts. 
II. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. EVIDENCE 
Donna Cobe Beekman 
1. A mother's testimony of her young child's out-of-court 
statement does not violate the hearsay rule or the confron-
tation clause. 
In re Damon H., 165 Cal. App. 3d 471, 211 Cal. Rptr. 623 
(3rd Dist. 1985). The California Court of Appeal in In re Damon 
H. affirmed the juvenile court's finding that a sexual molestation 
offense was committed against a child as well as affirming that it 
was proper to admit evidence under the spontaneous declaration 
exception to the hearsay rule. l>7 Furthermore, such an admission 
did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to 
confrontation. 58 
The evidence admitted was the testimony of a child sexual 
molestation victim's mother. She testified that her son, Colby, 
told her what happened shortly after the offense occurred. -
It was stipulated at the jurisdictional hearing that Colby, a 
two-year, nine-month-old child, was incompetent to testify. His 
mother testified that Colby went on a bike ride with his four-
57. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1240 (West 1966). "Evidence of a statement is not made inad-
missible by the hearsay rule if the statement ... [p]urports to narrate, describe, or ex-
plain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and ... [w]as made sponta-
neously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such 
perception." ld. 
5S. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." ld. 
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year-old brother in the care of his neighbors, Damon and 
Vance.c;g Upon returning home Colby was crying and Vance 
claimed the child had fallen. Colby's mother asked him what 
had happened and the child denied falling. The child then vol-
untarily declared his buttocks hurt and that "Damon put his 
weenie in my butt." 
In determining whether Colby'S statement was admissible 
the court found that even if he was too young to testify, Evi-
dence Code section 1240 allowed admission of a spontaneous 
declaration when there was sufficient evidence to support the re-
liability of such a statement. The court looked at the similar cir-
cumstances in People v. Orduno.60 A three-year-old child was 
molested in Orduno and in response to her mother's questioning 
she stated what had happened. Because the child was incompe-
tent to testify herself, the mother testified as to the out-of-court 
statement. The Orduno court found the statement to be sponta-
neous. It also noted that spontaneity is a recognized indicia of 
reliability that weighs against any violation of the confrontation 
clause.61 
Colby made his hearsay declaration within ten minutes of 
returning home from a forty-minute bike ride. Neither the lapse 
of time between the relevant event and the statement, nor the 
fact that it was elicited by his mother's questioning, deprived it 
of its spontaneous character. The court of appeal was satisfied 
with the trial court's finding that Colby was in a state of ex-
treme excitement for the entire period of time and was therefore 
able to remember accurately and communicate what had oc-
curred. The fact that the child's mother offered the testimony 
did not deprive the statement of its trustworthiness. 
The defendant argued that even if Colby's statement met 
the criteria for a hearsay exception its admission violated his 
constitutional right to confront his accuser.62 The court of ap-
peal disagreed by saying the confrontation clause did not confer 
an absolute right of confrontation, and further, that a California 
court had never proposed that admitting a spontaneous de clara-
59. Damon was fourteen years old and his brother Vance was twelve years old. 
60. 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1978). 
61. [d. at 747, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 811. 
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See supra note 58 for relevant language. 
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tion is a per se violation of the confrontation clause.63 
In dealing with the task of reconciling the hearsay exception 
rule with the confrontation clause, the court relied on Ohio v. 
Roberts64 and held that if the evidence lies within a well estab-
lished hearsay exception then it is presumed to be trustworthy. 
The "statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of 
reliability.''' Reliability can be inferred without more in a case 
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception. "65 
To further ensure the reliability of Colby's spontaneous dec-
laration, the court applied the four part test enumerated in the 
plurality opinion of Dutton v. Evans.66 Colby's explicit and im-
mediate description of the assault was an express assertion of 
the past event and made it unlikely that it was the result of 
faulty recollection. Damon's own testimony was independent ev:-
idence that Colby was under his care during the bike ride and 
supported the fact that Colby was able to acquire first-hand 
knowledge of the events referred to within the statement. As 
further indicia of the reliability of Colby's statement, the court 
noted Colby had no experience with sexual conduct prior to this 
event. 
The court's decision to admit the mother's testimony is im-
portant because it will typically be a parent to whom a young 
child victim relates any sexual assault. Since a young child will 
often be deemed incompetent to testify, this court's findings af-
fect the future admission of hearsay evidence as well as the con-
viction of child molesters. In applying the criteria enumerated in 
Dutton the court affirmed that a young child's spontaneous dec-
laration is reliable and consequently tips the balance against any 
63. Upon objection it would be impossible to exclude every statement made by a 
declarant not present at trial; for example, dying declarations are admissible. See CAL. 
EVID. CODE § 1242 (West 1966) (dying declarations are admissible). 
64. 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (admission of an unavailable witness's preliminary hearing 
testimony does not violate the defendant's right to confrontation if it bears sufficiently 
reliable criteria). 
65. [d. at 66. 
66. 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970). The factors to test reliability are: (1) if the hearsay 
statement included an express assertion of a past event, (2) if independent evidence sup-
ported the declarant's personal knowledge of the subject matter of the statement, (3) if 
there was a substantial possibility of faulty memory on the part of the declarant and (4) 
if the circumstances under which the statement was made indicate its reliability. [d. 
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constitutional violation of the confrontation clause. 
Linda C. Kramer 
B. SENTENCING 
1. Before a defendant is sentenced to consecutive terms for 
multiple counts of oral copulation, a jury must specifically 
find he used force or threats. 
People v. Riffey, 171 Cal. App. 3d 419, 217 Cal. Rptr. 319 
(3rd Dist. 1985). In People v. Riffey, the California Court of 
Appeal held that in order to implement Penal Code section 
667.6(c),67 which imposes full consecutive sentences for certain 
sex crimes, the jury must find that a defendant's conduct falls 
within its express provisions. Further, the court held that the 
jury must be instructed to specifically and positively declare 
which elements of the sex crimes defendant committed. If the 
jury determines defendant used threats or fear, it must also de-
cide whether the degree of threat or fear rose to the level of 
great bodily harm. 
Defendant was convicted of kidnapping,68 assault with a 
deadly weapon,69 two counts of forcible rape,70 and three counts 
of forcible oral copulation.71 He was sentenced to a prison term 
of forty-five years. The trial court's sentence included the impo-
sition of separate, consecutive prison terms for each of defend-
ant's three oral copulation convictions. The trial court cited sec-
tion 667.6 (c) as authority for ordering consecutive terms. 
Defendant's central challenge to the validity of his sentence 
was predicated on the ground that the trial court improperly re-
sorted to section 667.6 (c) as authority for the consecutive terms 
it imposed. Defendant argued that there is a difference between 
the statutory definition of oral copulation,72 upon which the jury 
67. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(c) (West Supp. 1986) which states, in pertinent part: 
"[A] full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation ... of com-
mitting . . . oral copulation by force . . . or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily in-
jury." [d. 
68. CAL. PENAL CODE § 207 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986). 
69. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1986). 
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(2) (West 1970 & Supp. 1986). 
71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a(c) (West 1970 & Supp. 1986). 
72. [d. Section 288a(c) provides that a person found guilty of oral copulation in con-
junction with "force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily 
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based its verdict, and the language of section 667.6(c),73 upon 
which the trial court based its sentence. 
The court of appeal agreed with defendant and held that 
there was a basic difference between the definition of oral copu-
lation in Penal Code section 288a and section 667.6(c). The 
court stated that under the section 288a(c), the degree of threat 
required for a conviction is based on a subjective standard. The 
victim need only fear bodily injury. However, for sentence en-
hancement under section 667.6(c), the degree of threat required 
for a conviction is based upon a more rigorous objective 
standard. 
The court concluded that the consecutive sentencing al-
lowed under section 667.6(c) could not be invoked since it was 
unclear from the jury's general verdict whether it had deter-
mined that defendant's act of forcible copulation was accom-
plished by force or threat. Moreover, if it were by threat, there 
existed the further uncertainty of the degree of threat. Thus, the 
court declared that absent a specific finding by the jury of a 
threat that reached the level of great bodily injury, the trial 
court could not impose full consecutive sentences pursuant to 
section 667.6(c). 
Kathy A. Alfieri 
C. SEX OFFENSES 
1. A woman raped by a former lover is entitled to benefits 
under the Victims of Violent Crimes Act regardless of 
whether criminal prosecution occurs. 
Anne B. v. State Board of Control, 165 Cal. App. 3d 279, 
209 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1st Dist. 1984). In Anne B. v. State Board of 
Control, appellant Anne B. brought an action to compel the 
State Board of Control (Board) to grant her claim for benefits 
under the Victims of Violent Crimes Act.74 The Board had 
denied her claim of $4,140 for psychological rehabilitation 
injury on the victim or another person •.. shall be punished by imprisonment .... " 
ld. 
73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(c) (West Supp. 1986). 
74. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13959 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). 
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necessitated by a violent rape perpetrated by a former lover. 
The Board rejected her claim because of her on-off relationship 
with the alleged rapist and because the district attorney had de-
clined to prosecute the matter, primarily due to that 
relationship. 
The Board determined that Anne B. had not met the Act's 
requirement of proof of a violent crime because the district at-
torney had declined to file charges against the alleged assail-
ant.75 The Board was swayed neither by a police report that 
pointed to specific medical evidence of trauma suffered by Anne 
B., nor by a letter from her therapist that indicated his belief in 
the victim's traumatic injuries. 
In addition to these facts, uncontested testimony at trial 
showed that an employee of the Contra Costa Victim/Witness 
Assistance Program (Program) approached Anne B. and that the 
employee and the Program were authorized by statute to coun-
sel victims of crimes and to assist them in preparing and 
presenting claims under the Act.76 Additional testimony indi-
cated that Anne B. also relied upon assurances of the availabil-
ity of state funds to cover the costs of therapy. Both the Pro-
gram employee and the therapist who subsequently treated her 
offered those warranties and assurances. The Anne B. court held 
that appellant justifiably relied upon the representations of the 
Program employee who assured her of compensation for the 
psychotherapy. 
The court of appeal held, contrary to the trial court, that 
the intent of the Victim of Violent Crimes Act is to assist a vic-
tim's rehabilitation" and that denial of benefits must be based 
upon narrowly construed grounds.7s The court further held that 
75. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13960(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986) which defines a crime 
of violence as "a crime or public offense ... which results in injury to a resident of this 
state .... " Id. 
76. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13835(e) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) states the legislative 
intent of the WitnessNictim Assistance Act insofar as "a large number of victims . . . 
are unaware of ..• their rights .... " Id. 
77. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13959 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986) which states: "It is in the 
public interest to indemnify and assist in the rehabilitation of suffer a pecuniary loss 
which they are unable to recoup without suffering serious financial hardship." Id. 
78. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13964 (West Supp. 1986). This section of the Act was added 
after the Anne B. assault, but before the case came before the court of appeal. The 
justices noted that although legislation is rarely meant to be retroactively applied, when 
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the Board, not the district attorney, decides whether a violent 
act occurred. 
The court found repugnant the Board's argument that Anne 
B.'s on-off relationship with her attacker implicated her as a 
participant in the events leading to the assault. The court re-
nounced this as a thinly disguised version of "she asked for it." 
The court found the relationship to be irrelevant as to legitimiz-
ing or diminishing the impact upon the victim of forced sexual 
intercourse. The court went on to state that while a district at-
torney may have to weigh the relationship's impact upon a jury' 
which may retain an outmoded way of thinking about rape, the 
State of California would not be a party to outdated sexual 
mores.79 
Generally a court extends considerable support to the deci-
sion of an administrative body such as the Board. However, a 
court may issue a writ of mandamus when a party alleges that 
the administrative body prejudicially abused its discretion.so In 
Anne B., the appellant argued that the Board's decision was not 
"supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record" 
as required by California Code of Civil Procedure.sl The court 
agreed. The court concluded that the evidence-the police re-
port and the therapist's statement-in conjunction with the 
wording of the Act's provisions, definitions and intent, clearly 
pointed to the appellant as a victim of a violent crime. 
The Anne B. decision demonstrates the court's interest in 
vigorously and assidiously enforcing the legislative intent of the 
the purpose of the legislation is solely to impart a clearer understanding of the intent 
behind earlier legislation, retroactive application is warranted. 
Subdivision (d) states that U[n]o application shall be denied solely because no crimi-
nal complaint has been filed, unless the complaint has not been filed for one of the rea-
sons stated in subdivision (b) and (c)." [d. § 13964(d). 
Subdivision (b) permits denial if the applicant's involvement in the events leading 
up to the crime is of a questionable nature. [d. § 13964(b). 
Subdivision (c) permits denial of the application if (1) applicant willingly partici-
pated in the crime or (2) the applicant failed to cooperate with the law enforcement 
agency investigating the crime. [d. § 13964(c). 
79. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5(a) (West Supp. 1986) which states in perti-
nent part that U[a]ny person who willfully inflicts upon his or her spouse, or ... upon 
any person resulting in a traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony .... " [d. 
80. CAL. CIV. PRoe. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). 
81. CAL. CIV. PRoe. CODE § 1094.5(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). 
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Victim of Violent Crimes Act. The purpose of the legislation is 
to compensate the victim of a violent act, rather than be an ad-
junct or facilitator to the state's quest for conviction of the as-
sailant. With compensation as a focus of the Victim of Violent 
Crimes Act, the often pivotal issue of the victim/attacker rela-
tionship in a criminal prosecution context, is irrelevant in the 
civil matter of determining benefits for the victim. The court of 
appeal has made a strong attempt to update the thinking of its 
administrative counterparts. 
T.A. Graudin 
2. A child molester may not exploit a technicality in order to 
avoid registering as a sex offender. 
People v. Tate, 164 Cal. App. 3d 133, 210 Cal. Rptr. 117 
(5th Dist. 1985). The California Court of Appeal held in People 
v. Tate that the state has a strong policy of requiring anyone 
who molests or annoys children to register as a sex offender. 
Thus the trial court erred in not requiring such registration. 
The victim was the seven-year-old daughter of Tate's girl 
friend. The child told a social worker that Tate sexually mo-
lested her for several months and finally had sexual intercourse 
with her. She reiterated these events during cross examination 
in a preliminary hearing. Tate denied the allegations and the 
child later disaffirmed the acts in a taped statement. In addition 
there was disagreement among doctors as to whether the child 
was in fact molested. Because of the conflicting testimony the 
district attorney accepted Tate's plea bargain of nolo contendere 
to violating Penal Code section 647a.S2 
At the time of this offense the California Penal Code had an 
express requirement that anyone convicted of violating subdivi-
sion 1 of section 647a must register as a sex offender.s3 That re-
quirement was enacted in 1947 and applied to certain sections, 
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647a (West 1970 & Supp. 1986). In pertinent part: "Every 
person who annoys or molests any child under the age of 18 is a vagrant and is punisha-
ble ..• by a fine ... or by imprisonment ... or by both •... " Id. 
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1970). In pertinent part: "Any person who ... 
has been or is ... convicted in the State of California shall ... register [as a sex of-
fender 1 with the chief of police of the city in which he resides or the sheriff of the county 
if he resides in an unincorporated area." Id. 
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including section 647a, which then consisted of two subdivisions. 
Subdivision 1 pertained to the annoyance or molestation of chil-
dren and subdivision 2 concerned loitering near schools-and 
public places where children are present. 
A discrepancy occurred when the legislature subsequently 
modified section 647 by deleting subdivision 2. The 1986 version 
of the statute had no subdivision 1, yet the registration require-
ment of section 290 still referred to subdivision 1. The legisla-
ture had neglected to conform section 290 with the new section 
647a. 
Tate argued that because section 647a had no subdivision 1 
when he committed the offense it was unclear whether the Leg-
islature intended to have the registration requirement apply to 
section 647a. The court concluded his argument had no merit 
and that the legislature's failure to bring the two statutes in con-
formity with one another was a mere oversight. A court cannot 
allow a legislative act to be proclaimed invalid because of uncer-
tainty when the statute can be clarified by simply correcting the 
inadvertent error.S4 
People v. Millss5 was controlling for this court. The defend-
ant in Mills was required to register as a sex offender upon con-
viction for lewd and lascivious conduct on a seven-year-old 
child. The court in Mills concluded that when someone attempts 
sexual penetration of a minor it was not shocking or unusual to 
require registration as a sex offender. 
The court of appeal explained that one who is convicted 
under 647a is motivated by an unnatural and abnormal sexual 
interest of children.s6 The objective of section 647a is to protect 
children from sex offenders and to facilitate the segregation and 
apprehension of such criminals. Since this statute did not pre-
scribe a penalty out of proportion to the offense, the Tate court 
chose not to interfere with a matter it felt to be within the legis-
84. "For example, if a supplemental or amendatory statute refers to a section of the 
original act by number, and the section referred to is not in harmony with the legislative 
purpose whereas only one other section is, the reference will be treated as being to the 
other section." 58 CAL. JUR. 3n Statutes § 113 (1980). 
85. 81 Cal. App. 3d 171, 146 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1978). 
86. See People v. Pallares, 112 Cal. App. 2d Supp 895, 900, 246 P. 2d 173 (1952). 
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lative province. 
The court was correct in observing that children require so-
ciety's utmost protection. This decision upheld the legislative 
purpose of guaranteeing that known child molesters be available 
for constant police observation. 
T.A. Graudin 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
A. EDUCATION 
1. The rule denying reimbursement to parents who unilater-
ally place their handicapped child in a private educa-
tional facility is subject to exception in cases of bad faith. 
In re John K., 170 Cal. App. 3d 783, 216 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1st 
Dist. 1985). In In re John K., the California Court of Appeal 
held that the well-established rule denying reimbursement to 
parents who unilaterally place a handicapped child in a private 
educational facility is subject to exception. The exception ap-
plies where a school district has acted in bad faith by flagrantly 
failing to comply with the procedural requirements enumerated 
in the Education of the Handicapped Act (Act).87 This exception 
entitles the parents to reimbursement. The court further held 
that the parents were entitled to attorney's fees. California law 
authorizes such fees where a public entity's conduct is arbitrary 
or capricious.88 
John K. was classified as learning disabled and education-
ally handicapped at an early age. In 1976, an Individual Educa-
tion Program (IEP) was established for him and he progressed 
fairly well. In 1977, John K. was placed in a public high school 
where he developed chronic patterns of truancy and severe be-
havioral problems. The school district was fully aware of John 
K.'s severe behavioral disorders for more than two years, but it 
took no remedial measures. Between October 1978 and April 
87. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1400-1461 (1978 & Supp. 1985). 
88. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 800 (West 1980) provides in pertinent part that "where the 
award, finding or other determination of such proceeding was the result of arbitrary or 
capricious action or conduct by a public entity or an officer thereof in his official capac-
ity, the complainant ... may collect reasonable attorney's fees .... " Id. 
34
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss3/6
1986] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 589 
1979, John K. spent considerable time in juvenile hall and resi-
dential facilities. During this time the school district neither re-
assessed John K.'s placement nor developed an appropriate IEP 
for him. John K.'s parents then placed him in a private residen-
tial facility. 
Plaintiffs, John K.'s parents, contended that fiscal responsi-
bility for John K.'s residential placement rested with the school 
district. Plaintiffs based their contention on the well-settled le-
gal principle that if private placement is needed in order to pro-
vide a handicapped child with an appropriate education, it shall 
be provided at no cost to the child's parents.S9 
Defendant school district acknowledged its duty to pay for 
appropriate, agreed-upon placement of a handicapped child. 
However, it asserted that unilateral placement by John K.'s par-
ents, which was not done pursuant to an IEP, negated any claim 
for reimbursement of private educational costs. 
Defendant's assertion was based upon the "stay put" re-
quirement90 of the Act which states that the student must re-
main in her present educational placement during the pendency 
of any proceeding conducted under the Act. Violation of the 
"stay put" requirement imposes the cost of the private educa-
tion upon the parents.91 
Plaintiffs contended that the "stay put" provision was inef-
fectual when John K. was placed at the private facility (peS) 
because neither a hearing nor a due process proceeding was 
pending. Plaintiffs further argued that only formal initiation of 
due process hearing procedures triggered the "stay put" require-
ment, and since there was no formal initiation the provision was 
inapplicable. However, the court agreed with the defendants and 
found that the "stay put" requirement was applicable during the 
89. 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1985). 
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (e)(3) (1978). The "stay put" requirement directs that, "during 
the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or 
local educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall 
remain in the then current educational placement of such child ••.. " [d. 
91. 34 C.F.R. § 300.403 (1985) provides: "If a handicapped child has available a free 
appropriate public education and the parents choose to place the child in a private 
school or facility, the public agency is not required by this part to pay for the child's 
education at the private school or facility." [d. 
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pendency of any proceeding pursuant to the Act, not only the 
due process hearing provisions.92 
Section 1415(b)(1) of the Act also enumerates parental pre-
hearing rights such as records examination and participation in 
placement decisions.93 When John was placed at PCS by his par-
ents, proceedings detailed in section 1415 were pending because 
he had an e?,isting IEP and a public school placement. The court 
rejected plaintiffs' formal initiation argument by stating that if 
such a rule was adopted, the statute's objective, which is to 
maintain the status quo during placement disputes, would be 
unfairly compromised. Thus, despite the fact that neither a for-
mal complaint nor a due process hearing had begun, the court 
found that the "stay put" requirement in the Act was in effect 
when John was unilaterally placed at PCS. 
The court noted however, that the "stay put" requirement 
need not be construed as an absolute bar to all retroactive tui-
tion payments. It held that justice may compel the sanction of 
self-help in certain factual situations where all other avenues 
have been exhausted. The court listed factors such as the effi-
cacy of the existing IEP and the reasonableness of the parties' 
actions as considerations that need to be taken in to account. 
In assessing whether the sanction of self-help was compelled 
in this case, the court stated that John's placement in public 
school had become entirely and obviously inappropriate as evi-
denced by his truancy patterns and troublemaking activities. 
Further, the school district was fully aware of John's severe be-
havioral disorders for more than two full years and it did not 
respond to his clear need for a placement change. During this 
period, the school district failed to reassess John's placement 
and failed to devise an appropriate IEP for him. This failure to 
reassess John's placement clearly violated the Act, which re-
quires annual review of IEPs.94 The court felt that under these 
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(3),(c),(d),(e) (1978). The court noted that the "stay put" 
requirement according to statute is applicable, during the pendency of any proceedings 
conducted pursuant to this section. The court also noted that this section enumerates 
not only due process hearing provisions but also pre-hearing rights of parents such as, 
right to examination of records, notice of placement change and participation in their 
child's placement decisions. 
93. Id. § 1415 (b)(l). 
94. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343 (1985). 
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exceptional circumstances, justice compelled the sanction of self-
help considering the inefficacy of the existing IEP and the un-
reasonableness of defendant's inaction. The court asserted that 
defendant's bad faith, as evidenced by its inaction, coupled with 
plainly inappropriate placement, justified unilateral placement 
by John K's parents. 
The dissent argued that because the school district con-
ducted numerous consultations with John's parents, it did not 
act in bad faith. The dissent did not disagree with the majority's 
inception of equitable considerations. 
The court awarded the parents attorney's fees under Cali-
fornia law95 which authorizes such fees when a public entity has 
conducted itself in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The court 
held that the school district's failure to reassess John's IEP and 
its general inaction in the face of an entirely inappropriate 
placement, constituted arbitrary and capricious action because 
its conduct was unsupported by a fair or substantial reason. 
In re John K. carves out a somewhat subjective exception to 
the "stay put" requirement of the Education of the Handi-
capped Act. Although reimbursement to John's parents was 
clearly warranted in light of the exigencies of this particular 
case, due process hearings were available to John's parents to 
challenge his placement, yet these were not used. 
Kathy A. Alfieri 
B. SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
1. A four year delay in filing sexual harassment charges 
against a state university professor was held unreasonable 
and prejudicial. 
Brown v. State Personnel Board, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1151, 213 
Cal. Rptr. 53 (3rd Dist. 1985). In Brown v. State Personnel 
Board, the court of appeal reversed the State Personnel Board's 
(Board) decision to dismiss appellant Brown for sexually harass-
ing female students. The court of appeal ordered him reinstated 
as a tenured professor at California State University at Sacra-
95. See supra note 88 for relevant language. 
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mento (CSUS). 
In 1981 the Board charged Brown with unprofessional con-
duct and with failure to perform the duties of his office.9s 
Charges included five separate instances of alleged misconduct 
which the Board termed "a series and pattern of sexual harass-
ment of female students. "97 
At the outset of the hearing the Board determined that two 
charges of immoral conduct were baseless. Two of the remaining 
three charges involved incidents which allegedly occurred in 
1975. Brown moved to dismiss these two charges on the basis of 
either the statute of limitations or the equitable doctrine of 
laches. Brown argued that California Government Code section 
1963598 which established a three year statute of limitations on 
harassment charges against a state employee precluded any 
complaint.99 
The Brown court rejected the argument on the basis that 
the statute of limitations in the government code did not apply 
to violations of the education code. But the court determined 
that section 19635, while not directly applicable in Brown's situ-
ation, nevertheless indicated "a legislative policy that a delay of 
three years is inherently unreasonable in the prosecution of a 
disciplinary action." 
The court combined that conclusion with Brown's alternate 
argument that the doctrine of laches controlled.loo The court ac-
knowledged that the doctrine of laches had been applied to 
96. CAL. Enuc. ConE § 89535(b}, (f) (West 1978 & Supp. 1986) states that U[a]ny 
permanent or probationary employee may be dismissed. . . for the following causes:. . . 
[u]nprofessional conduct ... [or] ... [fJailure or refusal to perform the normal and 
reasonable duties of the position." Id. 
97. The alleged incidents were similar. Brown would allegedly comment on the stu-
dent's attractiveness, indicate an interest in having sex with her, and then attempt to 
embrace and/or kiss the student. The usual locale of these alleged incidents was Brown's 
office on campus. 
98. CAL. GOV'T ConE § 19635 (West 1980) states that U[n]o punitive action shall be 
valid against any state employee for any cause for discipline based on any civil service 
law of this State, unless notice of such punitive action is served within three years after 
the cause for discipline ... first arose .... " Id. 
99.Id. 
100. 7 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 5239-40 (8th ed. 1974). Laches is the 
equitable equivalent to the statute of limitations, insofar as it is bars equitable relief in 
civil actions. I d. 
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quasi-adjudicative proceedings where defendant moved to dis-
miss charges on the grounds that the action had not been dili-
gently pursued.101 Brown had moved to dismiss the 1975 charges 
at the board hearing, arguing that a lapse of four years from the 
time the events allegedly occurred to the time charges were filed 
was itself proof that CSUS !IDd the Board had failed to "dili-
gently proceed." The Board rejected the motion and the court 
reversed. 
The court relied upon uncontested evidence that CSUS had 
knowledge of the 1975 incidents before Brown was granted ten-
ure in 1976. The female students involved in these alleged inci-
dents were apparently reluctant to formally complain. Their in-
action, combined with CSUS policies that required a written 
complaint prior to the commencement of any disciplinary proce-
dure, effectively halted any action against Brown. The court 
noted that the reticence of the students "may be of interest in 
the exercise of deciding to prosecute or not prosecute," but that 
a charge of sexual harassment did not concern the rights of the 
student but rather the duty of CSUS to deter misconduct with 
punishment. 
The court posited that any unreasonable delay in the disci-
plinary process caused by deference to an alleged victim's reluc-
tance to testify effectively and unfairly lets the employee "twist 
slowly in the wind." Although CSUS had a "practice" not to act 
without a written complaint, the Brown court said, "[A] self-im-
posed constraint is no more justification because it is delineated 
a practice than it if is discretion." 
In addition to showing unreasonable delay, a defendant in-
voking the doctrine of laches must show prejudice to his case 
directly attributable to the delay.lo2 The appellate court found, 
contrary to the Board and trial court, that Brown was 
101. Steen v. City of Los Angeles, 31 Cal. 2d 542, 190 P.2d 937 (1948). A municipal 
employee discharged for cause was reinstated by the California Supreme Court. The 
court reasoned that the delay of an administrative hearing beyond the time limit set by 
city charter was prejudicial to Steen as a matter of law. [d. 
102. Conti v. Board of Commissioners, 1 Cal. 3d. 351,461 P.2d 617, 82 Cal. Rptr. 
337 (1969). Conti had been criminally charged with bookmaking. His employer dis-
charged him when it learned of the charges. The court held that the extreme delay (more 
than three years between discharge and the case being heard by the appellate court) in 
resolving the validity of the discharge prejudiced Conti's ability to defend himself. [d. 
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prejudiced by the unreasonable delay because he had removed 
himself from alternative tenure-track employment opportunities 
from 1975 to 1981. The court reasoned that Brown was 
prejudiced by his reliance on the continuation of his tenured 
position. 
The Brown court determined that the doctrine of laches de-
feated all but one of the charges. The remaining charge, stem-
ming from a 1979 incident, could not by itself sustain the CSUS 
complaint alleging "a series and a pattern of sexual harrass-
ment." The court stated that Brown did not need to defend 
against each individual count in the complaint, but only needed 
to refute a sufficient number to invalidate the "series and pat-
tern" charge against him. 
The decision of the Brown court illustrates the extent an 
appellate court can arbitrarily alter the weight of evidence 
presented at trial in order to neg~te the lower court decision. 
The court placed great reliance on the similarity of purpose be-
tween the laches doctrine and the statute of limitations to 
thwart an injustice worked by a dimming of memories. But evi-
dence presented both at the Board hearing and at trial indicated 
the witnesses' memories were not dimmed by the passage of 
time. The court avoided discussing the apparent contradiction. 
The court concluded that Brown was prejudiced by his fore-
going alternate employment opportunities. However, if CSUS 
had been prompt in handling the matter, Brown would have had 
those four years to seek employment-with the stigma of dis-
charge for sexual harassment. The latter seems more prejudicial. 
The reticence of the court to sustain a charge of sexual har-
assment should be sufficient notice to the legislature to amend 
the laches/statute of limitations parameters. A "reasonable delay 
under the circumstances" approach may provide a more equita-
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IV. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 
A. EQUAL PROTECTION 
1. Black women are a cognizable group for the purpose of 
showing discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in 
jury selection. 
People v. Motton, 39 Cal. 3d 596, 704 P.2d 176, 217 Cal. 
Rptr. 416 (1985). In People v. Motton, the California Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court's ruling that defense counsel did 
not meet each of the requirements enunciated in People v. 
Wheeler103 for a prima facie showing of discriminatory exclusion. 
The trial court also failed to order the prosecutor to justify his 
challenges. The supreme court further held that black women 
are a cognizable group and that the prosecutor used a dispropor-
tionate number of challenges to exclude black women from the 
jury. 
During jury selection for defendant's second degree murder 
trial, defense counsel objected strenuously that the prosecutor 
was exercising his peremptory challenges to exclude black· 
women from the jury, and subsequently objected that the prose-
cutor was excluding blacks generally. The voir dire judge re-
jected counsel's argument and denied his Wheeler objection. De-
fendant renewed his objection at trial but the trial judge 
overruled it on the ground that voir dire judge had previously 
denied it. 
Defendant contended on appeal that the trial court had 
committed reversible error per se in ruling that defendant had 
not presented a prima facie showing of discriminatory exclusion. 
~he California Supreme Court found that defendant's conten-
tion placed in issue the three elements of a prima facie case of 
group bias: adequacy of the record, exclusion of a cognizable 
group, and the strong likelihood that persons were challenged 
103. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 503 P. 2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). The Wheeler court 
recognized the inherent danger of peremptory challenges being used to violate defend-
ant's right to a representative jury. The Wheeler court stated that in order to challenge 
the use of peremptories to remove jurors on the sole ground of group bias, objecting 
counsel must set forth a prima facie showing of discrimination. Opposing counsel must 
then justify her challenges. Id. 
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because of their membership in the group.l04 
The court held the record in this case to be sufficient to es-
tablish a prima facie showing of discriminatory exclusion. The 
record stated that by the time jury selection was completed, 
seven out of thirteen of the prosecutor's challenges had been di-
rected against blacks, five of them were black women. This left 
no blacks on the jury as finally selected. 
The court stated that several different factors and consider-
ations came into play when assessing whether or not a group is 
"cognizable." There must be factors which define and limit the 
group, such as race and/or gender. There must also be a common 
denominator in the group which promotes a basic similarity in 
attitudes, ideas or experiences. The court stated that black 
women share a common perspective arising from their life exper-
iences which is a direct result of the concurrence of racial and 
sexual discrimination. Therefore, the court held that black 
women are members of a cognizable group within Wheeler 
requirements. 1011 
The Wheeler court suggested several methods of supporting 
a prima facie showing of group bias.l06 However, the Motton 
court applied only one of the Wheeler methods in analyzing 
whether the jurors were challenges because of their membership 
in a cognizable group. The court adopted the strict numbers ap-
proach to this question, stating that the moving party should 
show that either her opponent has struck most or all of the 
members of a cognizable group, or has used a disproportionate 
number of challenges against the group. In Motton, the prosecu-
tor directed seven of thirteen challenges to remove black jurors. 
That high number persuaded the court that the prosecutor had 
used a disproportionate number of challenges to exclude all 
104. Id. at 258-80, 583 P.2d at 748-64, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 890-905. 
105. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. 
106. Id. Wheeler suggested three methods of analyzing whether those challenged 
were excluded because of their membership in a cognizable group: (1) moving party to 
show that the only thing the challenged jurors have in common is group membership; (2) 
moving party to show that the challenging party failed to engage jurors in more than a 
perfunctory voir dire-which would show challenging party's previous plan to exclude 
those jurors; (3) moving party to show that defendant is a member of the challenged 
group and the victim is a member of the group to which a majority of the chosen jurors 
belong.ld. 
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blacks from the jury. 
Although this decision purports to be an extension of the 
Wheeler rationale, on closer inspection it is simply an outline of 
a model application of the Wheeler elements for a prima facie 
showing of group bias. The court's painstakingly careful analysis 
and its scolding tone throughout the opinion when addressing 
the voir dire judge's mistakes were evidence of this intent. Mot-
ton may be seen as a blueprint for voir dire which clarifies the 
proper application of Wheeler. 
Kathy A. Alfieri 
2. Penal Code section 273.5 prohibiting corporal abuse of 
spouses or cohabiting partners does not violate the equal 
protection clause of the California Constitution. 
People v. Gutierrez, 171 Cal. App. 3d 944, 217 Cal. Rptr. 
616 (2nd Dist. 1985). In People v. Gutierrez, the California 
Court of Appeal held that Penal Code section 273.5,107 which im-
poses a criminal penalty for the willful and unlawful infliction of 
corporal injury by one spouse upon the other, resulting in a 
traumatic condition, does not violate the equal protection clause 
of the California Constitution. lOS 
Defendant was convicted by a jury under section 273.5 for 
severely beating his wife. His sentence was enhanced because of 
prior convictions.l09 
Defendant contended on appeal that section 273.5 denied 
him equal protection of the law because it discriminated unfairly 
against married and cohabitating partners. Defend~t based his 
assertion on the fact that the statute applies to only married and 
meretricious cohabitating relationships as its class of potential 
offenders, excluding divorcees and separated meretricious part-
107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1986). The court further held that co-
habitation is not an element of the offense, the jury instructions defining traumatic con-
dition is valid, and the trial court properly sustained defendant's prior convictions. 
108. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7. "A person may not be .•. denied equal protection of 
the laws." Id. 
109. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986). "Any person convicted of a 
serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony . . . shall receive 
... a [sentence] enhancement .... " Id. 
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ners. Defendant concluded that since persons in the excluded 
categories who engage in spousal violence cannot be found guilty 
of a section 273.5 violation, the statute violated the equal pro-
tection clause.llo 
The court agreed with defendant's assessment of the stat-
ute. However, the court held that classification by intimacy of 
relationship is a valid exercise of legislative judgment based on 
the inherent special circumstances of domestic violence. The 
court noted that the overwhelming amount of spousal beating 
occurs in the home, usually late at night, with only the family 
unit present, after the consumption of alcohol, and always out of 
police presence. The court reasoned that since married and 
cohabitating partners are both members of the high risk cate-
gory for domestic violence, the legislature's classification was 
constitutionally valid. 
Kathy A. Alfieri 
V. TORTS 
A. PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
1. Plaintiff, barred by the statute of limitations on a defective 
product action, may proceed with suit by alleging that the 
manufacturer's fraud was a percipient cause of the injury. 
Snow v. A.H. Robins Co., 165 Cal. App. 3d 120, 211 Cal. 
Rptr. 271 (3rd Dist. 1985). In Snow v. A.H. Robins Co., the court 
of appeal vacated a summary judgment by the trial court which 
held that all of the plaintiff's (Snow) causes of action against 
defendant A.H. Robins Co. (Robins) were barred by the statute 
of limitations. The court of appeal determined that Robins' al-
leged misrepresentation to Snow regarding the Dalkon Shield's 
inadequacy as a contraceptive device constituted a triable alle-
gation of fraud, thereby precluding a summary judgment for 
defendant. 
In 1973 Snow selected the Dalkon Shield as her birth con-
trol method. She had been informed by her physician that the 
shield was as effective as birth control pills in preventing preg-: 
110. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7. 
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nancy. Nevertheless, seventeen months later she underwent a 
therapeutic abortion. 
In 1981 Snow watched a "60 Minutes"lll program that de-
lineated the shortcomings of the Dalkon Shield, particularly the 
manufacturer's concealment of adverse side-effects and the de-
vice's higher-than-advertised pregnancy rates. Snow instituted 
her suit just under one year after viewing the program. 
The general rule on personal injury actions provides for a 
one year statute of limitationll2 which begins to run at the time 
of injury, even if the victim is unaware of the injury or the 
tortfeasor's identity.113 The trial court concluded that Snow's ac-
tion against Robins was time-barred. 
The appellate court noted that Warrington v. Charles Pfi-
zer Co.1l4 began a trend toward a rule providing that the statute 
of limitations accrues when the plaintiff becomes aware of facts 
relevant to establishing the cause of action and an identifiable 
tortfeasor.111l In applying the rule, the trial court first inquires 
into the plaintiff's diligence in discovering relevant facts and 
then determines whether to suspend (or toll) the statutory time 
limits. 11 6 The Snow court expanded Warrington by removing the 
plaintiff's burden of diligence when there is sufficient evidence 
to show that the defendant concealed facts which the plaintiff 
needed to state a claim.ll7 
111. A CBS television program that features investigative reports. 
112. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). 
113. 3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, ACTIONS §§ 351-352, at 380-81 (3d ed. 1985). 
"The cause of action ordinarily accrues when. . . the wrongful act is done and the obli-
gation or liability arises . ... " Id. § 351, at 380 (emphasis in original). "And the general 
rule is that the statute will begin to run though the plaintiff is ignorant of his cause of 
action or the identity of the wrongdoer." Id. § 352, at 381. 
114. Warrington v. Charles Pfizer Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130 
(1969). 
115. Id. at 569-70, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 135. The court permitted plaintiff a rule of dis-
covery that was limited by a one year statute of limitations accruing from the date of 
discovery or from the date when plaintiff should have discovered the tortious injury by 
exercise of reasonable diligence. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(4) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) provides a three year 
statute of limitations in "[aJn action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The 
cause of action in that case is not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by 
the aggreived party, of the facts constituting fraud or mistake." Id. 
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Robins contended that Snow's injuries (an unwanted preg-
nancy and an abortion) were readily apparent and neither insidi-
ous nor permanent in nature, and therefore did not implicate 
the discovery-of-facts rule. Consequently, Robins argued that 
Snow had one year from the date of the abortion to file her ac-
tion alleging Robins' negligence. The court of appeal agreed. 
However, the court determined that Snow's alternate claim al-
leging that her injuries were proximately caused by Robins' 
fraudulent concealment of both the shield's pregnancy rates and 
its safety constituted a separate cause of action seeking redress 
for a separate wrong. 
The court applied both "but for" and "substantial factor" 
tests for causationYs The court decided that under either analy-
sis Snow's injuries would not have occurred without the use of 
the Dalkon Shield. The court further held that "but for" the 
alleged misrepresentations by Robins, the device would not have 
been used by Snow. The court concluded that the actionable 
wrong was the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation by 
Robins, not Snow's unwanted pregnancy or abortion. Moreover, 
the court reasoned that the inducement to use the Shield was a 
consequence of the wrong rather than the wrong itself. 
Consequently, the court held that Snow's cause of action ac-
crued when she learned of the misrepresented pregnancy rates 
from "60 Minutes." Because the alleged fraudulent concealment 
by Robins prevented Snow from suspecting the incipient cause 
of her injuries, the court held she was exempt from Warring-
ton's requirement to diligently discover a cause of action. The 
court concluded that Snow was entitled to the three year statute 
of limitations for fraud, commencing from the date of the "60 
Minutes" program, and that she filed well within that time 
118. 4 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 622, at 2903 (8th ed. 1974) 
states in pertinent part: 
[I)t is necessary to show that the defendant's negligence con-
tributed in some way to the plaintiff's injury, so that "but for" 
the defendant's negligence the injury would not have been sus-
tained. . . . The "but for" rule has traditionally been applied 
to determine cause in fact. . . . [T)he term substantial factor 
[is used] ... to denote the fact that defendant's conduct has 
such effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to 
regard it as a cause ... in the popular sense, in which there 
... [is) ... the idea of responsibility. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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frame. 
The Snow court established a separate legal theory by 
which a plaintiff may recover damages in a personal injury ac-
tion involving a drug or intracorporeal device where the plaintiff 
can allege that defendant's fraud caused the physical injury. The 
plaintiff can plead fraud as the wrong and the actual injury as a 
result of the wrong, and thereby gain considerable latitude in 
stating a cause of action which would otherwise be time-barred. 
The applicable statute of limitations increases the filing period 
from one year to three years, from the time of discovery of the 
fraud. 
The court in Snow has taken a significant step toward pro-
viding the individual plaintiff equal footing in court with a large 
pharmaceutical corporation allegedly responsible for causing 
thousands of women to suffer. 
T.A. Graudin 
2. The statute of limitations in DES cases does not begin to 
run until plaintiff knows or should know all the elements 
of the cause of action. 
Kensinger v. Abbott Laboratories, 171 Cal. App. 3d 376, 217 
Cal. Rptr. 313 (1st Dist. 1985). In Kensinger v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, the California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's de-
cision of summary judgment. Defendant Abbott Laboratories 
had moved for summary judgment on the theory that plaintiff 
Kensinger's action was barred by the statute of limitations. The 
court of appeal observed that Abbott Laboratories had intro-
duced no evidence showing that as a matter of law Kensinger 
should have been aware of a basis for suit more than one year 
prior to filing the present cause of action. 
In deciding whether to grant the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, the court limited its task to finding whether 
a triable issue of fact remained to be adjudicated. The court re-
lied on the usual rule to resolve any doubt as to the propriety of 
summary judgment against the moving party.1I9 The court noted 
119. Sevilla v. Stearns-Roger, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 3d 608, 161 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1980) 
(in denying Stearns-Roger's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the stat-
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that this rule was particularly relevant because of Kensinger's 
"profound injury and her blamelessness in lack of knowledge of 
its causation." 
Kensinger was born in January, 1959. Her mother ingested 
DES120 while pregnant which resulted in Kensinger's exposure in 
utero. The manufacturers removed DES from the market in 
1971 because they learned that prenatal exposure to this drug 
was associated with adenocarcinoma.l21 When Kensinger was fif-
teen years old she was diagnosed as having vaginal and cervical 
clear cell adenocarcinoma and subsequently underwent surgery 
and radiation treatment. 
In 1980 Kensinger filed a complaint against numerous phar-
maceutical companies. She did so after discovering through a 
newspaper article that she had a right to sue without identifying 
the particular manufacturer of the specific DES ingested by her 
mother. The key causes of action were negligence, strict prod-
ucts liability, breach of implied warranty, breadth of express 
warranty and fraud. The complaint alleged that the defendants 
manufactured, distributed and sold DES, thereby causing 
Kensinger's injuries. 
The court observed that the usual statute of limitation in 
personal injury actions is one year.122 The parties agreed that 
the "rule of discovery"123 controlled and the only dispute fo-
cused upon the accrual date under this rule. Relying on G.D. 
Searle & Co. v. Superior Court,124 the court of appeal noted that 
where the victim was clearly unaware of the cause of injury and 
ute of limitations in products liability actions begins to run from the date of injury 
rather than from the date the product was purchased). 
120. PflYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 1142 (39th ed. 1985). "Diethylstilbestrol [DES] is 
a . . . synthetic estrogenic substance capable of producing all the pharmacologic and 
therapeutic responses attributed to natural estrogens." [d. DES was prescribed for the 
prevention of miscarriages or spontaneous abortions. 
121. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 15 (W. Morris ed. 1976). An adenocarci-
noma is "[a] malignant tumor originating in glandular tissue." [d. 
122. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) provides that 
"[w]ithin one year ... an action for ... injury to ... one caused by the wrongful act or 
neglect of another .... " [d. 
123. Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 104 Cal. App. 3d, 398, 407, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716 
(1980) (the period of limitation begins to accrue only when the plaintiff actually discov-
ers or by exercising reasonable diligence should have discovered both injury and its 
cause). 
124. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975). 
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where the pathology occurred with imperceptable trauma, the 
limitations period was delayed. 
Kensinger contended that the period of limitation did not 
begin to accrue until 1980 when she was both fully cognizant of 
the defendant's tortious conduct125 and had discovered her right 
to sue under Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.128 Abbott Laborato-
ries argued that Kensinger's 1980 suit was time-barred because 
she had known the cause of her injuries since 1977.127 
In applying the rule of discovery the court struggled with 
the question of whether Kensinger's discovery of the cause of 
action was reasonably delayed. The court recognized that the 
statute of limitations commences with the appearance of a rec-
ognizable event and not with the belated discovery of a legal 
theory. However, the distinction between legal theories and op-
erative facts is not always clear, particularly with drug product 
liability cases. The court concluded that even if a plaintiff is 
aware of an injury and its cause, he or she may not know a par-
ticular defendant committed any wrong and in such an instance 
litigation may be premature. 
Call v. Kezirian128 controlled for the Kensinger court. In 
Call, the parents knew that their child was born with Down's 
syndrome, but did not know until much later that the condition 
was due to the physician negligently forgetting to tell them 
about amniocentesis.129 The Call court decided that whether the 
plaintiffs should have known of the defendant's negligence was a 
question of fact and not of law. The defendant failed to conclu-
sively establish that the parents were put on notice of defend-
ant's negligence upon the birth of their child. The accrual period 
was therefore extended. 
125. Plaintiff asserted defendant "fail led] to adequately test the effects of DES 
upon the offspring of those subjects to whom the drug was administered, and fail led] to 
warn of the known risks of DES." 
126. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P. 2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) (defendant drug manu-
facturer has the burden of negating and apportioning damages in DES cases through 
market share liability). 
127. In 1977, an attorney advised Kensinger's father that Kensinger could not bring 
a successful suit for her injuries. 
128. 135 Cal. App. 3d 189, 195 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1982). 
129. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 53 (5th ed. 1982). "Amniocentesis is the 
transabdominal aspiration of fluid from the amniotic sac." [d. It is a diagnostic test used 
to discover fetal abnormalities. [d. 
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Applying Call, the Kensinger court held that "[k]nowledge 
of the occurrence and origin of harm cannot necessarily be 
equated with knowledge of the factual basis for a legal remedy." 
The court decided it would be unfair to J:,ar a suit when the 
plaintiff did not know her legal rights had been violated. 
Whether Kensinger's ignorance was reasonable under the cir-
cumstances was a question of fact. 
Persuaded by the reasoning of Anthony v. Abbott Laborato-
ries,130 the court of appeal said that the limitation period begins 
to accrue only when a plaintiff knows or should have known of a 
drug manufacturer's wrongdoing. The twelve plaintiff women in 
Anthony knew their physical injuries were the result of DES ex-
posure but did not know of the defendant's wrongful conduct 
until later. 
Abbott Laboratories in Kensinger argued that if the accrual 
period was delayed until the plaintiff knew of the drug manufac-
turer's wrongdoing, then the statute of limitation would be ne-
gated. The court responded that it had adopted an objective test 
be~ause the plaintiff still must use reasonable diligence to dis-
cover that the defendant committed an actionable wrong. 
The court of appeal was sensitive to the difficulties a plain-
tiff has in establishing exact time periods for drug-related inju-
ries. This decision lends further credence to Sindell and demon-
strates California's commitment to hold drug manufacturers 
[d. 
130. 490 A.2d 43, 46 (R.I. 1985). court reasoned that 
in a drug product-liability action where the manifestation of 
an injury, the cause of that injury, and the person's knowledge 
of the wrongdoing by the manufacturer occur at different 
points in time, the running of the statute of limitations would 
begin when the person discovers, or with reasonable diligence 
should have discovered, the wrongful conduct of the 
manufacturer." 
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liable for their defective products and negligence. 
Linda C. Kramer 
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